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Abstract. Recently, counterfactual quantum cryptography proposed by T. G. Noh
[Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 230501 (2009)] becomes an interesting direction in quantum
cryptography, and has been realized by some researchers (such as Y. Liu et al’s [Phys.
Rev. Lett. 109, 030501 (2012)]). However, we find out that it is insecure in practical
high lossy channel setting. We analyze the secret key rates in lossy channel under
a polarization-splitting-measurement attack. Analysis indicates that the protocol is
insecure when the loss rate of the one-way channel exceeds 50%.
21. Introduction
Quantum cryptography allows higher security than classical cryptography as it is based
on the laws of physics instead of the difficulty of solving mathematical problems.
Quantum key distribution (QKD)[1]-[3], which is to provide secure means of distributing
secret keys between the sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob), is often used to represent
quantum cryptography as the primary most important part. Now it has been researched
and developed in both theoretics and experiments. In theoretic, QKD could offer
unconditional security guaranteed by the laws of physics[4]. But due to the limitations
of real-life setting[5], such as the imperfect source, imperfect detector, loss and noise in
channel, practical QKD has security loopholes and has suffered some attacks, such as
photon number splitting (PNS) attack[6], Trojan-horse attack[7], faked state attack[8].
On the other hand, some achievements, such as decoy states mothod[9], measurement-
device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) scheme[10] were made to let practical QKD be
more secure.
Recently, counterfactual quantum cryptography proposed by Noh[11] has attracted
a lot of research, which allows participants to share secret information using
counterfactual quantum phenomena. It is believed that the security is based on that
quantum particles carrying secret information are seemingly not transmitted through
quantum channels. So far, some security proof[12], improvements[13] and experimental
demonstrations[14]-[18] of counterfactual quantum cryptography have been proposed.
However, we find out the counterfactual quantum cryptography[11] is insecure
in practical long distance communication. The secret key rate will be 0 under a
polarization-splitting-measurement attack when the loss rate of the one-way channel
is no less than 50%. Namely, the eavesdropper (commonly called Eve) can obtain all
the secret information. Nevertheless, the cheat is unknowable to Alice and Bob because
its effect just likes a reasonable loss in practical channel.
This paper is organized as follows. Sec. II reviews the counterfactual QKD proposed
in Ref.[11]. In Sec. III, We analyze the error rate of raw key in lossy channel. A
polarization-splitting-measurement attack is given in Sec. IV. In Sec. V, we analyze the
secret key rate under the attack. Finally, a short conclusion are provided in Section VI.
2. Counterfactual QKD
Fig.1 is the schematic of counterfactual QKD[11]. For simpleness, we have made some
equivalent adjustments on it. Alice triggers the single-photon source S, which emits a
short optical pulse containing a single photon at a certain time interval. She randomly
chooses the photon polarization in |V 〉 representing the bit value 0, or |H〉 representing
the bit value 1. Thereafter, the photon enters a beam splitter BS1 and is split to two
wave pulses sa and sb. Then the system state evolves into one of the following states:
|φ0〉 =
√
R|0〉a|V 〉b +
√
T |V 〉a|0〉b, (1a)
|φ1〉 =
√
R|0〉a|H〉b +
√
T |H〉a|0〉b. (1b)
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Figure 1. (color online). The schematic of counterfactual QKD. For simpleness, we
have made some equivalent adjustments on the original one. Whole space is divided by
dotted line into three sub-spaces, Alice’s site, Bob’s site and public space (i.e., Eve’s
space). Alice sends the ith single-photon in state |V 〉 or |H〉, representing bit 0 or 1,
to beam splitter BS1. Then the split pulses are transmitted into two paths a which is
always in Alice’s site, and b which is in public space toward Bob’s site. Bob randomly
uses |V 〉 (representing 0) or |H〉 (representing 1) PBS to block the pulse in path b when
his bit is identical to Alice’s, or let it pass when his bit is differ to Alice’s. When their
bits are different, detectors D2 should always click since the interferometry happens
in BS2. Else when their bits are same, the detectors D1 and D2 and D3 will click
with some probabilities since interaction-free measurement happens. Additional, it is
assumed that all of D1, D2 and D3 could detect the state’s polarization |V 〉 or |H〉.
All the D2’s and D3’s clicks and a part of D1’s clicks are used to detect eavesdropping,
and the rest of D1’s clicks with correct polarization are used as the raw key.
where subscripts a and b represent the path towards Alice’s site and the path toward
Bob’s site, respectively, and |0〉 denotes the vacuum state in the path a or b. R and
T = 1−R are the reflectivity and transmissivity of both BS1 and BS2, respectively.
Bob has two polarizing beam splitter (PBS), |V 〉 PBS (representing the bit value 0)
and |H〉 PBS (representing the bit value 1), where |V 〉 (or |H〉) PBS means it addresses
the state |V 〉 (or |H〉) towards detector D3, while the state |H〉 (or |V 〉) is sent towards
the beam splitter BS2. He randomly chooses to use the |V 〉 PBS or |H〉 PBS as his
device PBS1.
If Alice and Bob’s bits are different, the pulse on path b will be reflected by Bob
and combined again at Alice’s device BS2. The case just likes an interferometry with
4a single photon. In the ideal setting, detector D2 will click with certainty. Else if Alice
and Bob’s bits are identical, the path b will be blocked by Bob’s PBS1. The case just
likes an interaction-free measurement with a single photon. Here the state |φ0〉 will
be collapsed to |0〉a|V 〉b or |V 〉a|0〉b, |φ1〉 will be collapsed to |0〉a|H〉b or |H〉a|0〉b. In
the ideal setting, detector D1, D2 and D3 will click with probability RT , T
2 and R,
respectively.
So in the ideal setting, D1 clicks means Alice’s source photon basis and Bob’s PBS
basis are identify. Then Alice and Bob have a certain amount of identify bits, some
of which could be used to check possible eavesdropping, and the rest of with could be
used as raw key bits. And some statistical laws are between D2’s, D3’s clicks and Alice,
Bob’s bits, which could be used to check possible eavesdropping and judge error rate.
Additional, it is assumed that all the detectors D1, D2 and D3 could detect the state’s
polarization |V 〉 and |H〉, which also could be used to check possible eavesdropping.
Since the raw key bits come from the events of D1 clicks which means that Bob’s
measurement result is vacuum state, peoples feel that the participles which carry secret
information seemingly have not travelled between Alice and Bob. In fact, its security
is based on a type of noncloning principle for orthogonal states[11]: if reduced density
matrices of an available subsystem are nonorthogonal and the other subsystem is not
allowed access, it is impossible to distinguish two orthogonal quantum states |φ0〉 and
|φ1〉 without disturbing them.
3. Users’ error raw key rate depend on lossy channel
Similar to other QKD schemes, the limitations of real-life setting will also bring some
troubles to counterfactual QKD. Specially, high lossy channel will be a formidable
difficulty to it. In this section, we will analyze the error rate of users’ raw key pair, i.e.,
the different rate of Alice and Bob’s raw key pair, depend on lossy channel. ( Besides
the the loss in channel, some other loss also appear in the source and the devices and
some noise appear in the source, channel and the devices, but they are not in the paper’s
range.)
In the counterfactual QKD, the raw key rate is proportional to the single detector
click rate ( i.e., the rate of the case in which only one of detectors D1, D2 and D3
clicks), which will be affected by source single photon rate Rsingle and the loss rate.
Symmetrically, we suppose that both the loss rates in channel from Bob to Alice, and
that from Alice to Bob are η, i.e., the single photon will loss with probability η in one of
the two channels. We recall that (1) Alice’s raw key bits are generated from the source
single photons’ bases. (2) Bob’s raw key bits are generated from his PBS1’s basis, i.e.,
state in which basis would be sent from PBS1 toward D3.
Then we analyze the cases in which the raw key will be generated by Alice and
Bob. The analysis will be done on one single photon sent by Alice, which is in state |V 〉
or |H〉 with probability 1/2 respectively. And we suppose that the channel loss in the
channel in public space and Bob’s site, which is denoted as channel cA→B→A and could
5be divided to two parts ( the channels from Alice to Bob bA→B and from Bob to Alice
bB→A), is independent with state’s polarization |V 〉 and |H〉, i.e., all the possible wave
pulse will loss when channel loss happens. ( Note that the channel loss in cA→B→A is
different to the loss happens in Bob’s PBS in which only one polarization is blocked.
And also note that channel loss in cA→B→A does not mean that the photon vanishes in
cA→B→A with certainly since it might go through path a probably.) Theses cases are
divided by two elements (i) whether the loss happens or not in the channel in public
space and Bob’s site (then we divide the channel cA→B→A to two parts, the channels
from Alice to Bob bA→B and from Bob to Alice bB→A) and (ii) if loss happens, whether
it happens in the channels bA→B or bB→A.
Case I. Channel loss does not happen either on bA→B or bB→A.
This case just like the single photon has transmitted in a no-lossy channel. Namely,
there are not any blocks except the possible block from Bob’s PBS. Case I will generate
a raw key bit with probability P1 =
RT
2
as the reasons (1) Bob’s PBS blocks the special
polarization with probability 1
2
(2) a raw key bit will be generated with probability RT
when Bob’s PBS blocks the special polarization.
As both of the loss rates in the channels bA→B and bB→A are η, channel loss will not
happen on bA→B and bB→A with probability 1 − η respectively. So the Case I, channel
loss does not happen either on bA→B or bB→A, will occur with probability PI = (1− η)2.
The raw key rate comes from Case I is
RABraw1 = PI · P1 · Rsingle = (1− η)2 ·
RT
2
· Rsingle. (2)
Alice and Bob’s raw key are identify in this case.
Case II. Channel loss happens in the channel bA→B, regardless of whether channel
loss happens in the channel bB→A or not.
When channel loss happened in bA→B, no wave pulse will pass through bB→A, so
we combine the cases that (II-1) channel loss happens both in the channels bA→B and
bB→A (II-2) channel loss only happens in the channel bA→B, not in the channel bB→A to
Case II. Case II will generate an additional raw key bit with probability P2 = RT as
following analysis.
Without loss of generality, we suppose the single photon Alice sent is |V 〉. After
BS1, the state could be described as Eq.(1a). When it comes into Bob’s site, the state
evolves to |V 〉a|0〉b with probability T , or |0〉a|0〉b with probability R as the possible
pulse wave |V 〉b lost in the channel bA→B. The state |0〉a|0〉b will not lead to any clicks,
so no raw key will be generated. But as the state |V 〉a|0〉b, the photon in path a will
fire detector D1 and let Alice generate a raw key bit with probability R, fire detector
D2 with probability T . After Alice announced that D1 clicked, Bob would generate an
according raw key bit based on his PBS’s basis, i.e., state in which basis is sent toward
D3. So Case II will generate an additional raw key bit with probability T ·R as following
analysis.
Case II will happen with probability PII = η. Hence, with the loss in channel from
6Alice to Bob, additional raw key bits are generated, the totally rate of which is
RABraw2 = PII · P2 · Rsingle = η · RT · Rsingle. (3)
Since Bob has chosen his PBS’s basis randomly, his raw key bit will be identify, and
different with Alice’s with equal probability 1/2. So both of the correct and error raw
key rates are
RABraw2
2
.
Case III. Channel loss does not happen in the channel bA→B, but happens in the
channel bB→A. Namely, a complete block is in the channel bB→A except the possible
block from Bob’s PBS. Case III will generate a raw key bit with probability P3 = RT
as following analysis.
We still suppose the single photon Alice sent is |V 〉. If Bob’s PBS basis is same
with Alice’s basis, Bob’s PBS will send possible wave pulse |V 〉b toward D3. On one
hand, the system state evolves to |0〉a|V 〉b with probability R, which means that the
photon went through path b, and it will be destroyed by detector D3. So no pulse
wave will transmit from Bob to Alice. On the other hand, the system state evolves to
|V 〉a|0〉b with probability T , which means that the photon went through path a, then it
will fire detectors D1 and D2 with probabilities R and T respectively. Bob will generate
a raw key bit which is identify with Alice’s after she announces that D1 clicked, whose
probability is T ·R.
Else if Bob’s PBS basis is different with Alice’s basis, Bob’s PBS would pass
possible wave pulse |V 〉b, and send it back to Alice. After it lost in the channel from
Bob to Alice, the system state evolves to |0〉a|0〉b (with probability R) which means that
it is destroyed by the lossy channel, or |V 〉a|0〉b (with probability T ) which means that it
will fire D1 or D2 with probabilities R and T , respectively. Bob will generate a raw key
bit which is identify with Alice’s after she announces that D1 clicked, whose probability
is T · R.
So regardless Bob’s PBS basis is |V 〉 or |H〉, this case will generate a raw key
bit with probability RT . But Alice’s and Bob’s bits are same and different with equal
probability 1
2
.
The case will happen with probability PIII = (1 − η) · η as channel loss does not
happen in the channel bA→B with probability 1− η, happens in the channel bB→A with
probability η. Hence, with the loss in channel from Bob to Alice, additional raw key
bits is generated, the totally rate of which is
RABraw3 = PIII · P3 ·Rsingle = (1− η) · η · RT · Rsingle. (4)
Both of the same and different raw key rates are
Rraw3
2
.
All in all, the raw key rate is
RABraw = R
AB
raw1
+RABraw2 +R
AB
raw3
= 1+2η−η
2
2
· TR · Rsingle. (5)
The probability of that Alice’s and Bob’s raw keys in a same order are identify is
PAB sameraw =
RABraw1
+
RABraw2
2
+
RABraw3
2
Rraw
= 1
1+2η−η2
,
(6)
7the probability of that they are different is
PAB diffraw =
RABraw2
2
+
RABraw3
2
Rraw
= 2η−η
2
1+2η−η2
.
(7)
Namely, in users’ raw key pair, the error rate is PAB diffraw which should be correct by
some following classical postprocessing such as information reconciliation.
The error in users’ raw key pairs will give a lot of chances to Eve to perform some
attacks. But to Eve, the first aim is that her attacks should not be detected by the
users. Following polarization-splitting-measurement attack is one of the attacks.
4. Polarization-splitting-measurement attack
Usually, we assume that Eve has unlimited technological, which is only limited by the
laws of nature. So Eve could replace the lossy channel by a perfect quantum channel,
and use the excess power for her mischievous purposes. In this section, we first give an
attack method which can cheat the raw key bits and be concealed by the practical lossy
channel with loss rate 1
2
, then give the special cheat strategies according to special loss
rate range for cheating maximal information.
In the attack method, polarization-splitting and measurement will be used to cheat
secret information from channel bA→B (shown in fig.2). Eve first replaces the lossy
channel bA→B by a perfect quantum channel. She also has two polarizing beam splitters,
|V 〉 PBS representing the bit value 0 and |H〉 PBS representing the bit value 1. She
randomly chooses the |V 〉 or |H〉 PBS for the ith order, and inserts it in front of Bob’s
site.
If Eve’s ith bit is identical with Alice’s ith bit, the detector D4 will click with
probability R, else if her ith bit is differ to Alice’s ith bit, the detector D4 will not click.
In other words, the case that D4 clicks means that Eve’s bit is identical to Alice’s ith
bit, and the case that D4 does not click means that Eve is uncertain about Alice’s ith
bit now. We recall that Alice and Bob’s raw key pair will product from these uncertain
bits corresponding to the case that detector D4 does not click. So Eve cannot make
sure of the raw key bit. However, Eve could easily extract the raw key bit according to
what Alice and Bob will announce in the following processing.
Without loss of generality, we consider the case of Eve chooses 0, i.e., she inserts a
|V 〉 PBS. When Alice’s bit is 0, two possible cases are here. (1) When Eve’s detector
D4 clicked, the system state has been collapsed to |0〉a|V 〉b which means Alice’s bit is
identical to Eve’s bit 0, and vacuum state will go into Bob’s site. (2) Else when Eve’s
detector D4 did not click, the system has been collapsed to |V 〉a|0〉b, and vacuum state
still will go into Bob’s site. Altogether, vacuum state (i.e., nothing) always will go into
Bob’s site when Eve and Alice’s bits are same, which likes the pulse in path b has lost
completely by the lossy channel.
On the other hand, when Alice’s bit is 1, the pulse in path b will pass Eve’s PBS2
completely, so the system state still is |φ1〉(=
√
R|0〉a|H〉b +
√
T |H〉a|0〉b) after Eve’s
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Figure 2. (color online). The schematic of polarization-splitting-measurement attack
on counterfactual QKD. Eve performs attack on channel bA→B in front of Bob’s site.
Eve replaces the lossy channel bA→B by a perfect quantum channel. Then she randomly
uses |V 〉 (representing 0) or |H〉 (representing 1) PBS to block the pulse in path bA→B
when her bit is identical to Alice’s, or let it pass when her bit is differ to Alice’s. What
she dose just like a reasonable loss in path bA→B.
devices. The case is same to that Eve has done nothing, liking the ideal setting. In
the point view of Alice and Bob, all the following processes will just like the normal
processes. When D1 clicks, the corresponding bit will be chosen as a raw key bit by
Alice followed by announcing its order. Then Eve can always make sure that Alice’s
raw key bit is 1. In other words, when Eve and Alice’s bits are different, a raw key
bit will be produced with probability. And the probability will be revealed with Alice’s
announcement. Since the raw key bit is generated from the inverse of Eve’s PBS2’s
basis, Eve can not only know the raw key bits, but also decide its value with some
probability.
Since Eve chooses bit 0 or 1 randomly, her bit will be same and different with
Alice’s bit with probability 1/2 respectively. The complete loss will happen when their
bits are same, and the ideal setting will happen when their bits are different. Totally,
the cheat method likes a loss of rate 1
2
happens in the channel bA→B. The cheat method
could be used on every photon to cheat the secret information when η = 1
2
and will
not be detected (the analysis will be given in the following). To other value of η, more
complex strategies should be designed for optimal cheating.
We suppose the amount of Alice sent single photons is n. Using the above attack
9method, Eve could simulate practical loss channel with loss rate 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 and cheat
raw key bits with following strategies.
Cheat strategy (I) When 0 ≤ η < 1
2
, Eve performs the attack method on 2η · n
single photons randomly, and fills the raw key orders which she has not attacked in with
random bits.
Cheat strategy (II) When 1
2
≤ η ≤ 1, Eve performs the attack method on 2(1−η) ·n
single photons randomly, and blocks the remaining (2η − 1) · n single photons. After
Alice announced in which orders the remaining single photons have fired detector D1,
she fills these raw key orders in with random bits.
Like the loss in practical channel, what Eve did has brought some errors to the
protocol (we will analyze the details in next section). For instance, some D1’s clicks
happened not only when Alice and Bob’s bits were same, but also when they were
different as long as Eve blocked the channel. However, since the error rate is same
as that brought by practical lossy channel, it will be judged as a legal case by the
protocol’s detection process. The basis reason is that, the system state under the above
cheat strategies is same to the system state transmitted from a practical channel. We
will analyze it as follows.
We suppose the photon Alice sent is |V 〉. If Eve’s PBS past wave pulse |V 〉 to
Bob’s site, the density matrix of system state is
ρattack1 = |φ0〉〈φ0|, (8)
when it comes into Bob’s site. If Eve’s PBS blocked wave pulse |V 〉, the system state
is a mixed state with density matrix
ρattack2 = R|0〉a|0〉b〈0|b〈0|a + T |V 〉a|0〉b〈0|b〈V |a, (9)
when it comes into Bob’s site.
So after the strategy (I), the system state is a mixed state with density matrix
ρattackI = (1− 2η) · |φ0〉〈φ0|+ η · ρattack1 + η · ρattack2
= (1− η) · ρattack1 + η · ρattack2 ,
(10)
where 0 ≤ η < 1
2
. After the strategy (II), the system state is a mixed state with density
matrix
ρattackII = (1− η) · ρattack1 + [(1− η) + (2η − 1)] · ρattack2
= (1− η) · ρattack1 + η · ρattack2 ,
(11)
where 1
2
≤ η ≤ 1.
Now we analyze the system state in practical lossy channel without the attack
strategies. If the wave pulse in channel bA→B has not lost, the density matrix of the
system state is
ρloss1 = |φ0〉〈φ0|, (12)
when it come into Bob’s site. If the wave pulse in channel bA→B has lost, the system
state will be a mixed state with density matrix
ρloss2 = R|0〉a|0〉b〈0|b〈0|a + T |V 〉a|0〉b〈0|b〈V |a (13)
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when it come into Bob’s site.
Since the loss rate is η on the practical lossy channel bA→B, the general system state
is a mixed state with density matrix
ρloss = (1− η) · ρloss1 + η · ρloss2
= (1− η) · ρattack1 + η · ρattack2 ,
(14)
when it goes into Bob’s site, which is same with ρattackI when 0 ≤ η < 12 , ρattackII when
1
2
≤ η ≤ 1.
So the states are same either when the protocol suffers a lossy channel or when it
is under the cheat strategies. The conclusion is still tenable when the photon Alice sent
is |H〉. Consequently, Alice and Bob could not distinguish between the practical lossy
channel and the cheat strategies.
5. Secret key rate under the cheat strategies in lossy channel
In this section, we will analyze the protocol in lossy channel with the secret key rate
RQKD[19, 20], a convenient and commonly used quantitate measure of protocol security.
Secret key rate RQKD is the product of the raw key rate Rraw and the secret fraction
r∞. The secret fraction represents the fraction of secure bits that may be extracted from
the raw key. Formally, we have
RQKD = Rraw · r∞. (15)
The expression for the secret fraction extractable[19, 21] using one-way classical
postprocessing reads
r∞ = I(A;B)−min(IEA, IEB), (16)
where I(A;B) is Alice and Bob’s mutual information, IEA = maxEve I(A;E), IEB =
maxEve I(B;E). Since Alice and Bob’s each raw key pair is randomly in {0, 1}, it
should be H(A) = H(B) = 1. We also have P (A = 0, B = 0) = P (A = 1, B = 1) =
PAB sameraw /2, P (A = 0, B = 1) = P (A = 1, B = 0) = P
AB diff
raw /2. Combined with
Eqs.(6) and (7), it should be that
I(A;B) = H(A) +H(B)−H(A,B)
= 1 + 1 +
∑
A∈{0,1},B∈{0,1} p(A,B) log p(A,B)
= 2 + 2 · 1
2(1+2η−η2)
log 1
2(1+2η−η2)
+2 · 2η−η2
2(1+2η−η2)
log 2η−η
2
2(1+2η−η2)
.
(17)
Then we analyze the secret key rate under the cheat strategies (I) and (II) respectively
depend on the loss rate η by calculating min(IEA, IEB).
We recall that (1) Alice’s raw key bits are generated from the source single photons’
bases. (2) Bob’s raw key bits are generated from his PBS1’s basis, i.e., state in which
basis would be sent from PBS1 toward D3. (3) Eve’s raw key bits are generated from
the inverse of her PBS2’s basis, i.e., state in which basis would be sent from PBS2
toward Bob’s site. Now we analyze the cases in which the raw key will be cheated by
11
Eve when she cheats in the channel from Alice to Bob. And we still suppose the single
photon Alice sent is |V 〉.
5.1. Secret key rate under the cheat strategy (I) in lossy channel
We first analyze the cases in cheat strategy (I), i.e., the strategy with 0 ≤ η < 1
2
. We
recall Cheat strategy (I): When 0 ≤ η < 1
2
, Eve performs the attack method on 2η · n
single photons randomly, and fills the raw key orders which she has not attacked in with
random bits. We divide the cases with elements (i) whether Eve performs the attack
method or not and (ii) if Eve performs the attack method, whether her PBS basis is
same with Alice’s basis or not.
Cheated raw key I. The cheated raw key when Eve does not perform the attack
method.
For 0 ≤ η < 1
2
, Eve does not perform the attack method on (1−2η) ·n source single
photons, in which raw key bits will be generated as the case I and case III (shown in
Sec.III). Due to that the loss rate in the channel bA→B is η, case I will happen with
probability (1 − 2η) · (1 − η), case III will happen with probability (1 − 2η) · η. The
totally rate of these raw key is
REraw1 = ((1− 2η) · (1− η) · P1 + (1− 2η) · η · P3) ·Rsingle
= 1−η−2η
2
2
· RT · Rsingle.
(18)
Eve will guess these raw key bits, so the correct probability is 1
2
. So compared to Alice’s
and Bob’s raw keys, both of Eve’s same and different raw key rates in this case are
REA sameraw1 = R
EA diff
raw1
= REB sameraw1 = R
EB diff
raw1
= 1−η−2η
2
4
· RT · Rsingle.
(19)
Cheated raw key II. The cheated raw key when Eve performs the attack method,
and her PBS basis is same with Alice’s basis.
When Eve’s PBS basis is same with Alice’s basis (namely, Eve’s PBS will send
wave pulse |V 〉 toward D4), raw key bits will be generated as the case II (shown in
Sec.III). It will happen with probability η. So the totally rate of these raw key is
REraw2 = η · P2 ·Rsingle
= η ·RT · Rsingle. (20)
Since Eve always generates her raw key bit as the inverse of her PBS2’s basis, all her raw
key bits are different to Alice’s, and different to Bob’s with probability 1
2
. Compared to
Alice’s raw key, Eve’s same and different raw key rates are
REA sameraw2 = 0,
REA diffraw2 = η · RT ·Rsingle,
(21)
respectively. Compared to Bob’s raw key, Eve’s same and different raw key rates are
REB sameraw2 = R
EB diff
raw2
= η
2
· RT · Rsingle, (22)
Cheated raw key III. The cheated raw key when Eve performs the attack method,
and her PBS basis is different with Alice’s basis.
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When Eve’s PBS basis is different with Alice’s basis, Eve’s PBS will send wave
pulse |V 〉 toward Bob’s site. It will happen with probability 1
2
· 2η = η. And raw key
bits will be generated as the case I and case III. Due to that the loss rate in channel
from Bob to Alice is η, case I will happen with probability η · (1 − η), case III will
happen with probability η · η. So the totally rate of these raw key is
REraw3 = [η · (1− η) · P1 + η · η · P3] ·Rsingle
= η+η
2
2
· RT ·Rsingle.
(23)
Since Eve always generates her raw key bit as the inverse of her PBS2’s basis, all her
raw key bits are identify with Alice’s. Compared to Alice’s raw key, Eve’s same and
different raw key rates are
REA sameraw3 =
η+η2
2
·RT · Rsingle,
REA diffraw3 = 0.
(24)
Compared to Bob’s raw key, Eve’s same and different raw key rates are
REB sameraw3 =
η·(1−η)
2
· RT · Rsingle,
REB diffraw3 = η · η · RT · Rsingle.
(25)
All in all, the raw key rate Eve cheated is
REraw = R
E
raw1
+REraw2 +R
E
raw3
= 1+2η−η
2
2
RT · Rsingle,
(26)
which is same as users’ raw key rate. The probabilities of that Eve and Alice’s raw key
bits are same and different are
PEA sameraw =
PEA sameraw1
+PEA sameraw2 +P
EA same
raw3
REraw
= 1+η
2(1+2η−η2)
,
(27)
PEA diffraw =
P
EA diff
raw1
+PEA diffraw2 +P
EA diff
raw3
REraw
= 1+3η−2η
2
2(1+2η−η2)
.
(28)
The probabilities of that Eve and Bob’s raw key bits are same and different are
PEB sameraw =
PEB sameraw1
+PEB sameraw2 +P
EB same
raw3
REraw
= 1+3η−4η
2
2(1+2η−η2)
,
(29)
and
PEB diffraw =
P
EB diff
raw1
+PEB diffraw2 +P
EB diff
raw3
REraw
= 1+η+2η
2
2(1+2η−η2)
.
(30)
. In fact, Eve’s error rate will not be larger than 50% by using a simple way[22].
Similar to the calculation of I(A;B), combined with Eqs.(27-30) it should be
I(E;A)i = H(E) +H(A)−H(E,A)
= 1 + 1 +
∑
E∈{0,1},A∈{0,1} p(E,A) log p(E,A)
= 2 + 2 · 1+η
4(1+2η−η2)
log 1+η
4(1+2η−η2)
+2 · 1+3η−2η2
4(1+2η−η2)
log 1+3η−2η
2
4(1+2η−η2)
,
(31)
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and
I(E;B)i = H(E) +H(B)−H(E,B)
= 1 + 1 +
∑
E∈{0,1},B∈{0,1} p(E,B) log p(E,B)
= 2 + 2 · 1+3η−4η2
4(1+2η−η2)
log 1+3η−4η
2
4(1+2η−η2)
+2 · 1+η+2η2
4(1+2η−η2)
log 1+η+2η
2
4(1+2η−η2)
,
(32)
Then the secret fraction is
ri∞ = I(A;B)−min(I iEA, I iEB), (33)
where 0 ≤ η < 1
2
.
For simpleness, we set R = T = 1
2
. Then secret key rate is
RQKD = Rraw · ri∞
= 1+2η−η
2
8
· ri∞ · Rsingle,
(34)
where 0 ≤ η < 1
2
.
5.2. Secret key rate under the cheat strategy (II) in lossy channel
Now we analyze the cases in which the raw key will be cheated by Eve using cheat
strategy (II), i.e., the strategy with 1
2
≤ η ≤ 1. We recall Cheat strategy (II): When
1
2
≤ η ≤ 1, Eve performs the attack method on 2(1−η) ·n single photons randomly, and
blocks the remaining (2η− 1) ·n single photons. After Alice announced in which orders
the remaining single photons have fired detector D1, she fills these raw key orders in
with random bits.
In the strategy, the attack is performed with probability 2(1 − η) replacing the
probability 2η in cheat strategy (I). So the amount of raw key rate generated by the
attack is 1−η
η
· (REraw2 +REraw3).
In addition, Eve blocks the remaining (2η− 1) · n wave pulses in the channel bA→B
followed by guessing the possible raw key bits. This just likes case II. It will generate
raw key bits whose amount is (2η − 1) · P2 · Rsingle. And both of the probabilities of
them are same and different with Alice (and Bob’s) are 1
2
.
Hence, the raw key rate is
REraw = [
1−η
η
· (REraw2 +REraw3) + (2η − 1) · P2] · Rsingle
= 1+2η−η
2
2
RT · Rsingle,
(35)
which is same as users’ raw key rate. The probabilities of that Eve’s and Alice’s raw
key bits are same and different are
PEA sameraw =
1−η
η
·(REA sameraw2 +R
EA same
raw3
)+
(2η−1)
2
·P2
REraw
= 2η−η
2
1+2η−η2
,
(36)
and
PEA diffraw =
1−η
η
·(REA diffraw2 +R
EA diff
raw3
)+
(2η−1)
2
·P2
REraw
= 1
1+2η−η2
.
(37)
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The probabilities of that Eve’s and Bob’s raw key bits are same and different are
PEB sameraw =
1−η
η
·(REB sameraw2 +R
EB same
raw3
)+
(2η−1)
2
·P2
REraw
= 1−η+η
2
1+2η−η2
,
(38)
and
PEB diffraw =
1−η
η
·(REB diffraw2 +R
EB diff
raw3
)+
(2η−1)
2
·P2
REraw
= 3η−2η
2
1+2η−η2
.
(39)
Then we have
I(E;A)ii = H(E) +H(A)−H(E,A)
= 1 + 1 +
∑
E∈{0,1},A∈{0,1} p(E,A) log p(E,A)
= 2 + 2 · 2η−η2
2(1+2η−η2)
log 2η−η
2
2(1+2η−η2)
+2 · 1
2(1+2η−η2)
log 1
2(1+2η−η2)
,
(40)
and
I(E;B)ii = H(E) +H(B)−H(E,B)
= 1 + 1 +
∑
E∈{0,1},B∈{0,1} p(E,B) log p(E,B)
= 2 + 2 · 1−η+η2
2(1+2η−η2)
log 1−η+η
2
2(1+2η−η2)
+2 · 3η−2η2
2(1+2η−η2)
log 3η−2η
2
2(1+2η−η2)
,
(41)
Then the secret fraction is
rii∞ = I(A;B)−min(I iiEA, I iiEB), (42)
where 1
2
≤ η ≤ 1.
For simpleness, we set R = T = 1
2
. Then secret key rate is
RQKD = Rraw · rii∞
= 1+2η−η
2
8
· rii∞ · Rsingle,
(43)
where 1
2
≤ η ≤ 1.
5.3. Discuss of the secret key rate
Fig.3 shows Alice and Bob’s mutual information I(A;B), the minimum of Eve’s
and Alice’s, Eve’s and Bob’s mutual information min(I(E;A), I(E;B)) when Eve
uses the cheat strategies (I) and (II), and the secret fraction r∞(= I(A;B) −
min(I(E;A), I(E;B))) compared to the loss rate η. It indicates that r∞ = 0 when
1
2
≤ η ≤ 1 under the cheat strategies.
We explain something about the data. When 1
2
≤ η ≤ 1, min(I(E;A), I(E;B)) =
I(E;A), which is monotonic. But when 0 ≤ η < 1
2
, it will be min(I(E;A), I(E;B)) =
I(E;B), which is not monotonic. Specially, when η = 1
3
, minimal value I(E;B) = 0 is
here with PEB sameraw = P
EB diff
raw . The reason is that information entropy is non-negative.
With the increasing of disparity between η and the special value 1
3
, the disparity between
PEB sameraw and P
EB diff
raw increases, consequently, I(E;B) increases. (Also see [22])
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Figure 3. (color online). I(A;B) is Alice’s and Bob’s mutual information.
min(I(E;A), I(E;B)) is the minimum of Eve’s and Alice’s, Eve’s and Bob’s mutual
information. r∞ is the secret fraction. They are given compared to loss rate η. The left
figure is the whole show of them. In the right figure, the ordinate scale is magnified.
Fig.4 shows the counterfactual QKD’s raw key rate Rraw and the secret key rate
RQKD compared to the loss rate η. It indicates that Rraw increases with the increasing
of η, RQKD decreases with the increasing of η. Specially, RQKD will be equal to 0 when
1
2
≤ η ≤ 1 under the cheat strategies, which means the protocol is insecure.
As QKD applications, they usually need to distribute secret information over long
distance, so the high loss rate of channel is inevitable. For instance, let us assume that
the transmission line is a fiber-based channel, which is always slightly lossy (about 0.2
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Figure 4. (color online). The raw key rate Rraw and the secret key rate RQKD
compared to loss rate η. Here the key rate is the key bit rate generated by one single
photon, and we set T = R = 1/2. The left figure is the whole show of them. In the
right figure, the ordinate scale is magnified.
dB/km). If we want to use the cryptographic system over reasonable distances, say up
to 15 km, transmission losses will be as high as 3dB, or about 50%. Then Eve could
cheat all the secret information using the cheat strategies proposed without leaving any
clues.
6. Conclusion
In conclusion, we pointed out that counterfactual cryptography[11] is insecure in
practical high lossy channel. We proposed a polarization-splitting-measurement attack
and analyzed the secret key rate in lossy channel. The analysis indicates that the
protocol is insecure when the loss rate of the channel from Alice to Bob is up to
50%. Since the attack’s effect just likes a loss channel, it is invisible to the protocol’s
participants. Maybe the security flaw could be overcome by using nonorthogonal states
as BB84 QKD[1], but the protocol will be more complex and lower efficient.
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